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tracking system needed?
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Abstract
A review of epidemiological studies on the incidence of MRSA infections overtime was performed along with an analysis
of data available for download from Hospital Compare (https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare). We found the
estimations of the incidence of MRSA infections varied widely depending upon the type of population studied, the types
of infections captured and in the definitions and terminology used to describe the results. We could not find definitive
evidence that the incidence of MRSA infections in U.S. community or facilities is decreasing significantly. Of concern are
recent data reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) on MRSA bloodstream infections which indicate
that by the end of 2015 there had been little change in the average facility Standardized Infection Ratio (0.988), compared
to a 2010–2011 baseline and is significantly increased compared to the previous year. This is in contradistinction to the
recent Veterans Administration study which reported over an 80% reduction in MRSA infections. However, this
discrepancy may be due to the inability to reconcile the baselines of the two data sets; and the observed increase may
be artifactual due to aberrations in the NHSN tracking system. Our review supports the need for implementation of a
comprehensive tracking and monitoring system involving all types of healthcare facilities for multi-drug resistant
organisms, along with concomitant funding for both staff and infrastructure. Without such a system, determining
the effectiveness of interventions such as antibiotic stewardship and chlorhexidine bathing will be hindered.
Keywords: Surveillance, MRSA, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, EIP, Emerging Infection Program, Multi-drug
resistant organisms, Epidemiology, MDRO, VA, UHC
Introduction
Recent investigative reports in the media has brought into
question the adequacy of the United States’ Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) tracking system
along with whether the epidemic of MRSA is being
brought under control [1].
Currently the United States has adopted a “one size does
not fit all” approach and has relatively few mandates re-
lated to infection control. The Presidential Advisory
Council on Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria is
studying these issues, but data supporting the contention
that the MRSA epidemic is being brought under control
appears to be largely derived from the Emerging Infection
Program (EIP). The data from this program has come
under criticism by the news media for its sample size, age
and limited geographic representation [1].
Having a standardized reportable methodology with
comparative data is critical to enable both researchers
and policy makers to formulate and implement effective
protocols to confront the epidemic of MRSA in the
United States. The following are major epidemiology re-
ports with varying methods of tracking and reporting of
MRSA infections.
Emerging infection program (EIP)
There are three major papers which summarized pro-
gressive results in adult patients from the EIP surveil-
lance program which derives its data from nine
metropolitan areas in the United States [2–4]. Since each
paper encompasses and adds onto the data previously
reported, we will focus our comments on the last report
of Dantes, et al. [4]. These studies reported “invasive”
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MRSA infections as detected by laboratory-based case
finding. An invasive infection was defined as a positive
MRSA culture from a normally sterile site, such as
blood, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid, cerebral spinal fluid,
or bone [2, 4, 5]. Eighty percent of invasive infections
had positive blood cultures and only 22% were skin in-
fections [4]. The overall in-hospital fatality rate was 13%.
This definition mainly captures severe infections. The
infection shown in Fig. 1 would not necessarily be re-
portable under the invasive infection metric. For data ac-
quisition dates 2005–2011, Dantes, et al., reported a
27.7% decrease for healthcare-associated community-
onset, 54.2% decrease in hospital-onset (culture taken
greater than three days after admission), but only a 5.0%
decrease in community associated infections.
Covering a similar time-period (2005–2010) and using
data from the EIP, Iwamoto, et al. [5] reported that in
pediatric patients 90 days and older, there was not a sig-
nificant decrease in hospital-onset, or healthcare-
associated community-onset “invasive” MRSA infections.
They also observed a 10.2% per year increase in
community-associated “invasive” infections. However, they
did observe significant decrease in MRSA infections of
11.3% per year in children 3–89 days of age [5].
The surveillance network (TSN) database-USA
This tracking system contains electronically submitted
data from more than 300 laboratories across the United
States [6]. For data acquisition years 2005–2008, Klein,
et al. [6] reported a stable rate of MRSA related hospital-
izations for pneumonia and blood infections; whereas
the proportion of cultures with the assumed hospital as-
sociated MRSA phenotypes increased. This data appears
to contradict the EIP data reported by Kallen, et al. [3]
for the same data acquisition dates which showed de-
creasing MRSA infections, being most pronounced with
healthcare-associated infections. Klein, et al. [6] stated a
possible explanation for this difference was geographical
variability and that their sample had greater geographical
representation.
University healthcare consortium data (UHC)
The UHC estimated MRSA infections per 1000 hospital
discharges from Academic Medical Centers and found that
MRSA infections, as determined from billing data, doubled
(20.9–41.7) between the years of 2003 and 2008 [7].
National healthcare safety network (NHSN)
The NHSN is a comprehensive reporting system for la-
boratory identified MRSA bloodstream infections that
occur in acute care hospitals which participate with
Medicare’s Prospective Payment System. Infections that
occur greater than three calendar days after admission
are defined as hospital-onset. Infection rates are risk ad-
justed and compared to a 2010–2011 baseline [8]. How-
ever, standardized data are available for MRSA
bloodstream infections in less than 2000 of the approxi-
mate 5000 acute care facilities in the United States. In
addition, small rural hospitals which are defined as crit-
ical access and pediatric facilities may not have reported
data. Veterans Administration and military hospitals also
use a different system for quality control and reporting
of infections. Critical access hospitals also tend to have
limited resources to confront infection disease and are
at risk of disseminating resistant organisms to larger fa-
cilities through their referral network.
As shown in Fig. 2, there has been little or no change
in infection rates compared to the 2010 to 2011 baseline
[9]. Initially, there appeared to be a slight decrease, but
the rates have trended upward and returned to the base-
line. It should be noted that the baseline data was col-
lected under voluntary reporting, as the subsequent data
shown in Table 1 was collected with mandatory reporting.
Thus, one could argue that the baseline data was from
higher performing facilities. In addition, the increase ob-
served in 2015 may have been caused by methodological
changes in how community MRSA environmental pres-
sure is calculated. However, the data indicates that there
has been little change in hospital-onset MRSA blood-
stream infection rates between the initial and final
mandatory reporting periods as shown in Fig. 2 and
Table 1, and that as of 2015 the United States did not
achieve the MRSA bloodstream infection reduction goal
of 25% [10].
Another observation is that Table 1 is needed to fully
explain the data acquisition windows’ length and time
periods which are presented in Fig. 2. This adds to the
complexity of data analysis and exemplifies the need for
a more standardized system of reporting.
Fig. 1 MRSA infection which would not necessarily be reportable under
the bloodstream or invasive infection metrics. Centers of Disease Control
and Prevention photo archive (Photo credit: Gregory Moran, M.D)
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U.S. Military and veterans administration (VA) healthcare
systems
U.S. Military facilities and the VA Healthcare Systems
have reported dramatic decreases in MRSA infections.
Landrum, et al. [11] reported a decrease in hospital-
onset MRSA bacteremia from 0.7 cases per 100,000
person-years to 0.4 cases per 100,000 person-years from
2005 to 2010. Community-onset MRSA bacteremia de-
creased from 1.7 to 1.2 cases per 100,000 person-years
during the same time period. However, there was not a
significant decrease in MRSA skin, wound or soft tissue
infections for either hospital-onset or community-onset
MRSA infections. This report analyzed Tricare benefi-
ciaries treated at U.S. Military facilities and was also
based upon laboratory data with hospital-onset
infections defined as cultures performed greater than
three calendar days after admission.
The VA has also seen a dramatic reduction in MRSA
infections in 127 reporting acute care hospitals. From
October 2007 to October 2015, healthcare-associated
MRSA infection rates dropped 87.0% in ICUs and 80.1%
in non-ICU patient areas, achieving an incidence of
0.147 and 0.090 infections per 1,000 patient days, re-
spectively [12]. In long term care facilities the VA re-
ports MRSA infection reductions of 49.4% from July
2009 to September 2015 [12].
Unlike the private sector, government healthcare deliv-
ery systems have a standardized delivery system with
strong national control. Implementation and adherence
to protocols would be expected to be easier. Thus, ex-
trapolating performance data from governmental sys-
tems to the private sector should be done with caution.
Discussion
Five reports which had data acquisition periods which
ended on or before 2011 are summarized in Table 2.
These reports measured different types of MRSA infec-
tions and measured different patient populations (mili-
tary facilities, medical centers, general population,
pediatric patients and those who reside in a restricted
geographic area). These variables make comparison of
the various study results difficult. Although, many stud-
ies reported data showing a decrease in MRSA infec-
tions, increases were found in one study for total MRSA
infections, in another for community-associated infec-
tions and another for the assumed MRSA hospital-
associated phenotype. This latter study also observed the
rates for MRSA pneumonia and bloodstream infections
which remained constant In several of the studies the
observed decrease did not reach statistical significance.
Fig. 2 Graph of National (Patient Level) Standardized Infection Ratio (SIR) for MRSA Bloodstream Infections in relationship to MRSA goals and to
the performance of VA hospitals in reducing total non-ICU MRSA infections. Data was used only from hospitals that also had a calculable SIR. The
data acquisition periods for the SIR are shown in Table 1. Only the baseline and final data points for the VA MRSA Infections are shown
Table 1 Hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infections – facility
level and national (patient level) performance
Acquisition dates Average facility
SIR
Average
national SIR
Number
of facilities
1/1/2013 to 9/30/2013 0.95876 0.96766 1666
1/1/2013 to 12/31/2013 0.91540 0.94380 1889
7/1/2013 to 6/30/2014 0.91484 0.91766 1906
10/1/2013 to 9/30/2014 0.89426 0.90195 1904
1/1/2014 to 12/31/2014 0.89134 0.89422 1916
4/1/2014 to 3/31/2015 0.89717 0.90124 1911
7/1/2014 to 6/30/2015 0.92568 0.91835 1899
10/1/2014 to 9/30/2015 0.96378 0.94811 1825
1/1/2015 to 12/31/2015 0.98812 0.98740 1830
Data for National Level Performance was derived from hospitals that also had a
calculable SIR. NHSN data from https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare
(SIR: Standardized Infection Ratio) (The Facility Level data standard deviation for
acquisition dates 1/1/2014 to 12/31/2014 was 0.7730. The Facility Level data
standard deviation for acquisition dates 1/1/2015 to 12/31/2015 was 0.8753.
Unpaired t-test P < 0.0003)
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Recent data reported from the VA and NHSN are
more applicable to policy formulation but both data sets
are not comprehensive and are not directly comparable,
since both have different baseline dates and one measures
total MRSA infections and the other MRSA Bloodstream
Infections.
This lack of uniformity of MRSA reporting has hin-
dered the United States’ ability to formulate control
strategies. For example, two different categories of con-
trol protocols are starting to emerge. One which is simi-
lar to the one used by the VA and is based upon
identification, isolation and/or decolonization. The other
is based on the REDUCE MRSA study [13] and imple-
ments a protocol of universal daily bathing with chlor-
hexidine along with intranasal mupirocin.
As shown in Fig. 2, the VA has reported excellent reduc-
tions for MRSA infections compared to little if any reduc-
tion that has been observed in recent NHSN data for
MRSA bloodstream infections. But how does one com-
pare the baselines? Maybe the reduction in the NHSN
data had already occurred? This cannot be determined by
the conflicting data in earlier studies (see Table 2). We can
only assume that the 2010–2011 baseline shown in Fig. 2
is at an unacceptable level, since the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services has sent a goal of a 50% re-
duction by 2020 [14].
This is an important question. The protocol for uni-
versal daily chlorhexidine bathing which gained rapid
popularity in the United States was reported in May 2013
and widely disseminated by Agency of Healthcare Re-
search and Quality in September 2013 [15]. Dr. John Jerni-
gan from the CDC in Jan. 2017 stated that “this practice is
now being used routinely in over 60% of hospitals in the
United States” [16]. But using the NHSN data (acquisition
dates from Jan. 1, 2015 to Dec. 31, 2015) the rates of
MRSA bloodstream infections has not appeared to de-
crease (see Fig. 2) and have now risen almost back to the
baseline (Facility SIR = 0.988; P < 0.0003 compared to
2014 data with acquisition dates from Jan 1, 2014 to Dec.
31, 2014).
However, even this increase can be questioned due to
aberrations in the data caused by compensation for com-
munity MRSA environmental pressure on facilities. It
should be noted that these types of adjustments are con-
troversial, since they would also be expected to mitigate
the impact of facilities not doing surveillance in regions
with high environmental MRSA pressure.
Is the United States on the right track and is universal
chlorhexidine bathing a policy which should be imple-
mented on a wide spread basis or should the United
States be expanding the implementation of MRSA
screening and isolation/decolonization protocols? A com-
prehensive tracking system would be critical in providing
data to answer this question.
Conclusion
With the various study populations and data gathering
methodologies, comparisons between epidemiological
reports are difficult to make. However, we were not able
to identify firm evidence that there has been a significant
decrease in total or healthcare-associated MRSA Infec-
tions in the United States. In addition, the contradictions
between the studies is a testament for the need of a
comprehensive tracking system for MRSA and other
multi-drug resistant organisms. A comprehensive system
should also report infections from all types of healthcare
facilities, not just acute care hospitals. With the advent
of electronic medical records, the reporting of MRSA
cultures and infections along with supplemental infor-
mation can be automated, making the system less
burdensome.
Policymakers in Washington, DC appears to be fo-
cused on major funding of the development of new anti-
biotics. It is evident that one of the first steps we should
take is the implementation of a comprehensive tracking
system for monitoring resistant organisms, along with
concomitant funding for both the staff and infrastruc-
ture. Without this, the difficulty achieving the 2020
MRSA reduction goal of 50% will be hindered [14]. De-
termining the effectiveness of interventions such as anti-
biotic stewardship and chlorhexidine bathing will be
impaired. In addition, the United States may not be able
to accurately prioritize antibiotic development, and will
have an encumbered early warning system for the emer-
gence of resistance to newly developed antibiotics.
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